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ABSTRACT 
Measuring Local Government Technical (In)efficiency: An Application and 
Comparison of FDH, DEA and Econometric Approaches 
by Benny Geys and Wim Moesen * 
Economic efficiency – understood in terms of jurisdictions providing a maximum 
amount of output for a given level of inputs – is one potential means to evaluate 
public policies.  Various approaches, however, co-exist to measure the 
(technical) efficiency of organizations. Given that these rely on different 
underlying assumptions, it is important to assess whether, and to what extent, 
the approach taken affects the outcome of efficiency studies. The present paper 
employs a dataset of local governments in Flanders in 2000 to compare the 
three common approaches to measure (in)efficiency (i.c. FDH, DEA and 
econometric techniques). Our results indicate that the methodological choices 
of instrumentation have a substantial effect on analytic performance 
measurement. Hence, assessing the robustness of the results across various 
approaches to efficiency measurement is crucial to avoid incorrect inferences. 
 
Keywords: Free disposal hull, data envelopment analysis, stochastic frontiers, 
government (in)efficiency, Flemish municipalities  
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Zur Messung lokaler Regierungs(in)effizienz: Anwendung und Vergleich 
verschiedener Ansätze aus FDH, DEA und Ökonomie 
Ökonomische Effizienz – verstanden im Sinne der Maximierung der Aus-
bringungsmenge für ein gegebenes Inputlevel – ist ein gängiges Mittel um 
staatliche Politiken zu evaluieren. Allerdings existieren mehrere Herangehens-
weisen, um die (technische) Effizienz von Organisationen zu messen. Unter der 
Voraussetzung, dass diese auf unterschiedlichen Annahmen basieren, ist es 
von Interesse, ob und inwiefern die gewählte Methode die Ergebnisse einer 
Untersuchung beeinflusst. Mit dem Datenmaterial aus flämischen Gemeinde-
verwaltungen im Jahr 2000 vergleichen wir die drei bedeutendsten Methoden 
der (In-)Effizienzmessung (FDH, DEH und ökonometrische Verfahren). Unsere 
Ergebnisse zeigen, dass die Wahl der Methode einen substantiellen Einfluss 
auf die Performancemessung hat. Aus diesem Grunde erscheint es mitunter 
unerlässlich, die Robustheit von Ergebnissen anhand verschiedener Effizienz-
methoden zu überprüfen, um nicht Gefahr zu laufen, unzulässige Folgerungen 
zu ziehen.  
                                                 
*  The authors are grateful to André Decoster, Jon H. Fiva, Holger Sieg and four anonymous referees for 
helpful comments.   
 
   1
Introduction 
In many countries, a further decentralisation of tasks from higher level governments to the 
municipal level is contemplated.  While smaller jurisdictions with more homogeneous 
populations may be better suited to match the provision of public goods with the preferences 
of their constituents (cfr. Mill, 1861; Musgrave 1959; Oates 1972, 1999; Tullock, 1969), an 
exceedingly small scale of operation may be economically unviable.  That is, lower-level (and 
therefore smaller) jurisdictions may lack a sufficient fiscal basis, be unable to exploit 
economies of scale or lack sufficient managerial competencies and experience among their 
staff.  The increased international attention for further decentralization – both in fiscal terms 
as in the allocation of tasks – thus raises the question whether local jurisdictions can (or do) 
adequately execute the tasks bestowed on them.   
 
One way to evaluate public policies is by analysing whether or not (local) governments use 
their resources in an economically efficient manner.  Economic efficiency – understood in 
terms of jurisdictions providing a maximum amount of output for a given level of inputs (i.e. 
minimizing ‘waste’ or ‘friction’) (e.g. Koopmans, 1951; Lovell, 1993) – is obviously only one 
among many public concerns (besides effectiveness, equity, responsiveness, adequateness, 
appropriateness, and so on; Dunn, 2004, 223-231).  Our focus on it should not be taken to 
mean that it is more important that the remaining concerns or that policy decisions are not 
taken within a certain political and institutional environment (which affect policy outcomes).  
Nevertheless, administrative decisions about strategy and tactics and the evaluation of public 
policy often include measures of efficiency (besides the other above-mentioned criteria; 
Dunn, 2004, 358) and it is therefore crucial to understand the tools employed to measure it.  
Moreover, economic efficiency refers to a central (potential) benefit of decentralisation.  In 
fact, when local governments are lacking in economic efficiency, the economic benefits from 
further a decentralisation of tasks are likely to be limited.  There is little to gain by shifting 
tasks to inefficient levels of government.   
 
Numerous studies have previously taken up the issue of local government efficiency (see De 
Borger and Kerstens, 2000, for a review).  Most of these studies, however, concentrate on 
efficiency in particular areas of public good provision: e.g. waste collection, police services, 
road maintenance, and so on (e.g. Kalseth and Rattsø, 1998; De Borger and Kerstens, 2000).
1  
Though such analyses are of interest in their own right, they do not allow an assessment of the 
overall performance of governments.  Nonetheless, general performance assessments are 
crucial to most adequately review the potential (economic) benefits of government 
decentralisation.  Moreover, most previous work focuses on one methodological approach to 
efficiency measurement (i.e. FDH, DEA or a stochastic approach).  Still, when the results of 
efficiency analyses are affected by the approach taken, a multiple-design approach might be 
crucial to avoid erroneous inferences (see, for example, De Borger and Kerstens, 1996; Bauer 
et al., 1998; Cummins and Zi, 1998; Matthijs and Swinnen, 2001; von Hirschhausen et al., 
2006; Balcombe et al., 2006).   
 
The present analysis addresses both these caveats.  We assess overall local government 
performance in the Flemish municipalities in the year 2000.  Moreover, and arguably more 
importantly, we provide a comparison of three different approaches to efficiency 
measurement (i.e. FDH, DEA and stochastic approaches).  As such, we assess whether the 
                                                 
1   For exceptions, see, among others, Vanden Eeckaut et al. (1993), De Borger et al. (1994), De Borger and 
Kerstens, (1996), Athanassopoulos and Triantis (1998), Worthington (2000), Sampaio De Sousa and Stosic 
(2005), Hindriks and Gerard (2005), Geys (2006), Balaguer-Coll et al. (2007), Geys et al. (2007) and Borge 
et al. (2007).   2
conclusions drawn from efficiency analyses are robust to the technology employed.  Our main 
findings indicate that a) there is some definite scope for improvements in the technical 
efficiency of Flemish local governments (a common finding under all three methodological 
approaches) and b) the level and variation in the level of inefficiency is affected by the 
approach taken.  The latter finding should induce due caution in the interpretation of results 
from studies relying on one single approach only (and indicates that such studies should be 
used very carefully in administrative decisions about strategy and tactics). 
 
1. Approaches to measure (government) efficiency 
Economic efficiency, as mentioned, can be defined as jurisdictions providing a maximum 
amount of output for a given level of inputs (or requiring a minimum level of inputs for a 
given output).  Most fundamentally, this implies that when a given jurisdiction X can 
transform A units of input into B units of output, other jurisdictions should be able to achieve 
the same outcome (if they operate equally efficiently).  From this perspective, efficiency 
measurement appears straightforward at first sight.  One first determines which combinations 
of inputs and outputs designate optimal or efficient behaviour.  Then, in a second step, each 
jurisdiction is compared with the ‘best’-performing jurisdictions to determine the level of 
(in)efficiency.  Applying these two steps in a real-world setting is, however, replete with 
difficulties.  One set of problems concerns the choice of inputs and outputs to be considered 
in the analysis (Lovell, 1993).  Obviously, this choice is not value-neutral and depends on 
what is deemed important by both the subject(s) of and those responsible for the efficiency 
study. This is of central concern since the results of efficiency analyses depend very much on 
these input/output choices, implying they should be adequately defended.  A second set of 
problems is more methodological.  How do we determine which input-output combinations 
are ‘optimal’ or ‘efficient’ (known as the ‘best practice’ frontier)?  Is any deviation from the 
best practice frontier inefficiency or – and if so, how much – is to be interpreted as, say, 
measurement error? 
 
While the value-laden input/output decisions are hard to resolve a priori (and will not be 
explicitly tackled in the present work), a number of different approaches have been proposed 
in the literature to address the methodological problems brought forward (for an excellent 
introduction, see Lovell, 1993).
2  One of the earliest approaches to efficiency measurement is 
known as Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), a non-parametric method proposed by Farrell 
(1957).  Under DEA, jurisdictions are designated as efficient when they outperform not only 
all other jurisdictions in the sample, but also all possible linear combinations of all other 
jurisdictions (even when the resulting input/output combinations do not occur in reality and 
are in some sense ‘virtual’ jurisdictions).  Hence, each jurisdiction is compared to all possible 
‘real’ and ‘virtual’ opponents, and deemed efficient only when it obtains a better overall 
performance (i.c. a higher aggregate index value) than all these opponents.  A jurisdiction that 
is outperformed for at least one conceivable weighting scheme is “DEA-dominated” or 
inefficient (Melyn and Moesen, 1991; Cherchye and Vermeulen, 2006).  The idea behind this 
approach is that dominated jurisdictions should, given the observed performance of all other 
jurisdictions in the sample, be able to perform better in at least one dimension (either reduce 
inputs or boost outputs).  This is not the case for non-dominated observations, which are thus 
deemed efficient.
3   
                                                 
2   All proposed methods achieve relative rather than absolute efficiency measures in the sense that they build 
not on some absolute definition of efficiency, but rather determine the ‘best practice’ based on the decision-
making units at hand (the only possibility in real-world applications; see also Hauner, 2005; Staat, 2006). 
3   To give a simple numerical example, assume three jurisdictions (A, B and C).  While these, for simplicity, 
use a given amount of inputs, they differ in the quantity of two outputs X and Y they produce (A, B, and C   3
 
The efficient jurisdictions then form the central elements of the best practice frontier (the 
exact shape of which depends on specific assumptions made; see below).  To determine the 
relative (in)efficiency of non-efficient jurisdictions, their input/output combinations are 
projected onto this frontier.  One thereby weighs the input/output combinations of the 
jurisdictions that directly dominate the inefficient jurisdiction in such a way as to minimize 
the estimated inefficiency of the inefficient observation (thus applying, in a sense, “benefit-of-
the-doubt” weights; see Melyn and Moesen, 1991).  More technically, DEA works through 
solving a linear programming problem of the following form:   
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Where Ck and Cj represent total input by organisation k and j respectively, ykr and yjr denote 
the output level for organisations k and j with respect to output r, s equals the number of 
outputs taken into account and n is the number of organisations under study.  Finally, zj are 
weights given to the organisations with which organisation k is compared in the determination 
of its (in)efficiency.  In equilibrium, the value of the objective function, k λ , represents how 
efficient organisation k employs its inputs (Ck) in the production of its outputs (r = 1, …, s).  
Note that the formulation in equation (1) imposes constant returns to scale, leading the best 
practice frontier to be a straight line from the origin touching the input-output combination of 
the most efficient organisation(s) (hence, we label the result DEA-crs; see figure 1).   
However, constant returns to scale implies that jurisdictions can linearly scale input and 
outputs without affecting the level of efficiency.  Such an assumption may be valid over 
limited ranges of production, but is unlikely to be justifiable in general.  Assuming constant 
returns to scale may thus be overly restrictive.  Hence, some scholars have allowed for 
variable returns to scale by adding one additional constraint (i.e. 0 z
n
1 j j = ∑ = ) to equation (1).  
This is labelled as DEA-vrs below (see figure 1).
4   
 
Another important characteristic of the linear programming problem in equation (1) is that the 
best practice frontier is assumed to be strictly convex.  Still, there are “no valid theoretical 
arguments for assuming a priori that production possibilities are truly convex” (Cherchye et 
                                                                                                                                                          
produce 50, 25 and 7 units of X and 2, 10 and 35 units of Y respectively).  Hence, while A is most efficient 
in producing output X (given the input constraint), C plays this role for output Y.  Moreover, as one cannot 
construct a linear combination of the remaining two jurisdictions that outperforms (or dominates) A or C, 
both are termed ‘efficient’.  Jurisdiction B is dominated by at least one other jurisdiction in both output 
dimensions and one can construct a linear combination of A and C that outperforms B (e.g. 50% A and 50% 
C would produce 26 X and 21 Y).  Hence, B is inefficient.  
4   This additional constraint generates an efficiency measure without scale efficiency effects such that the 
comparison of DEA-crs and DEA-vrs gives an indication of the presence of scale effects (e.g. Worthington, 
2000; Wu et al., 2003; von Hirschhausen et al., 2006).   4
al., 2000, 263-264; see also McFadden, 1978) and some empirical studies suggest violations 
of the convexity hypothesis (e.g. Hasenkamp, 1976).  Hence, this assumption was relaxed in 
later work by Deprins et al. (1984) and Tulkens (1993).  By imposing two additional 
restrictions on equation (1) (i.e.  0 z
n
1 j j = ∑ =  and zj ∈ {0, 1}), their Free Disposal Hull (FDH) 
method yields a frontier with a staircase shape in the input-output space (see figure 1).  The 
basic idea in terms of determining efficient and inefficient observations is, however, the same 
as under DEA (see above). 
 
Figure 1:   Non-parametric best practice frontiers with one input (C) and one output (Y) 
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Importantly, both non-parametric approaches (DEA and FDH) share the common feature that 
all deviations from the frontier are designated as inefficiency.  This has two important 
implications.  Firstly, since the different restrictions posed on the problem in equation (1) 
influence the shape of the efficiency frontier (and thereby how closely it envelops the data), 
they also directly affect the efficiency estimates retained from the analysis.  While this 
mitigates the value of the retained (in)efficiency estimates, it has less impact on the relative 
performance of the assessed jurisdictions (which, as mentioned in footnote 2, is the most 
important information from these types of analyses).  Secondly, and more problematic, it 
entails that deviations from the best practice frontier which are due to measurement errors or 
other stochastic influences are also identified as inefficiency (which is inappropriate).   
 
Stochastic parametric approaches to efficiency measurement – developed by Aigner et al. 
(1977) and Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977) – avoid the latter problem by allowing the 
researcher to distinguish between measurement error and inefficiency.  With the risk of over-
simplifying this methodological approach, one might describe the basic idea as the estimation 
of a production (or cost) function upon which “inefficiency is identified with [the] 
disturbances in [this] regression model” (Greene, 1993, 68).  The disturbance term – i.e. the   5
realized deviations from the estimated frontier isoquant – is, however, (non-trivially) 
separated into random white noise and inefficiency.  More technically, an appropriate 
formulation of a standard, general production function would be (in translogarithmic form 
following Christensen et al., 1973 and dropping municipality subscripts for convenience): 
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where, as before, C designates the input indicator, y indicates the various output indicators, s 
points to the number of outputs in the model and βr and λ rq are parameters to be estimated.  
Crucially, the error term ε is composed of two parts (assumed to be independent) and thereby 
allows distinguishing between measurement error and inefficiency.  More specifically, it 
consists of a symmetric component (u; assumed to be white noise) and a one-sided non-
negative component representing inefficiency (v; generally assumed half-normally distributed 
though similar findings result from assuming a truncated normal distribution, cfr. De Borger 
and Kerstens, 1996; Méon and Weill, 2005).  While estimation of equation (2) generates 
estimates of the composed error term ε, the conditional distribution of vi given (ui  + vi) 
contains all available information about vi for any organisation i (Jondrow et al., 1982; Bauer, 
1983).  Either the mean or the mode of this conditional distribution can then be used as a 
point estimate of vi: i.e. E(vi | ui + vi) or M(vi | ui + vi) respectively.  Below, we use the mean 
of this conditional distribution (denoted SF-Mean) to designate cost inefficiencies.  Hence, 
SF-Mean indicates to what extent inputs can be reduced without reducing current output 
levels (though, for ease of comparison with the non-parametric approaches, we invert this 
index to obtain efficiency rather than inefficiency ratings).   
 
2. Local governments in Belgium: Institutional context 
As in most West-European countries, Belgian municipalities have traditionally had important 
responsibilities with respect to education, housing, health care, social welfare, recreation, 
infrastructure and the environment (including refuse collection) (John, 2001, 36).  While the 
local governments have significant authority in executing these particular tasks, their 
description and aims are laid down is federal and regional legislation (e.g. the “Municipal 
Law” or Gemeentewet).  Hence, though article 162 of the Belgian Constitution explicitly 
states that municipalities can take any initiative to the benefit of their inhabitants and in the 
communal interest, they are by no means free to do as what they please.  In fact, the same 
article of the Constitution also asserts that municipalities are subject to intervention from 
higher-level governments to prevent violations of the law or harm to (broader) public interest.  
This places Belgium firmly in a “Southern-European”, Napoleonistic tradition where the 
central (and, in the case of Belgium, regional) government wields significant power (John, 
2001, 34-39; Moesen, 2005). 
 
More recently, increased discussions have taken place in Belgium on a further 
decentralisation of tasks from higher-level governments to the municipal level (Moesen, 
2005).  This discussion first appeared in 1988-89 when a significant amount of resources and 
responsibilities – in total amounting to about one third of state spending – was redistributed 
from the federal to the regional level (Gérard, 2001).  The idea that about 25 per cent of these 
resources and responsibilities could immediately be further de-centralised towards the local 
level was at that point, however, disregarded (Moesen, 2005).  Nevertheless, this 
‘localisation’ discussion revived at the onset of the new Millennium, when the Flemish 
regional government launched a ‘core assignments debate’ (kerntakendebat) aimed at a   6
thorough discussion concerning the redistribution of tasks and resources across the regional, 
provincial and municipal governments.  Thus far, however, the process remains very much 
top-down (i.e. the regional government decides about which tasks divestiture towards the 
municipalities can be discussed) rather than bottom-up (i.e. the municipalities demanding 
more autonomy) (Moesen, 2005). 
 
This institutional setting is important since it has been frequently argued that decisions made 
by those at the top involve choices among values or goals, whereas decisions lower in the 
organization or delivery system are largely devoid of such value content (see Simon, 1957; 
March and Simon, 1958).  Hence, in systems that have traditionally been driven by the central 
government (such as Belgium), the work of local governments has much larger “factual” (or 
means-focused) content than “value” (or ends-focused) content.  Local government work in 
Belgium thus can be best described as ‘do-or-die’ and has traditionally been somewhat devoid 
of value choices.  This is very different from, for example, the US, where municipalities have 
much more political weight and independence (and the value-component of local policy 
decisions is much larger).  This generates a situation that is particularly conducive to 
efficiency measurements (as the value content or neutrality of the inputs and outputs then 
becomes less of an issue).
5  
 
3. Empirical analysis 
In this section, we apply the procedures discussed in the previous section (FDH, DEA-crs, 
DEA-vrs and SF-Mean) to data from 304 of the 308 Flemish municipal governments in the 
year 2000 (data availability precluding the inclusion of the remaining four municipalities).  As 
input variable (C), we use total current expenditures in each municipality.
6  The level of local 
public goods provision is gauged through five output variables (see Vanden Eeckaut et al., 
1993; De Borger et al., 1994; De Borger and Kerstens, 1996): (a) the number of subsistence 
grants beneficiaries, (b) the number of students in local primary schools, (c) the surface of 
public recreational facilities (in hectare), (d) the total length of municipal roads (in km) and 
(e) the share of municipal waste collected through door-to-door collections.  These measures 
relate to important responsibilities of Flemish local governments with respect to social, 
educational, recreational, infrastructure and environmental services.  More specifically, the 
number of subsistence grants beneficiaries and primary school students proxy the extent of 
social welfare and educational service provision.  The surface of public recreational facilities 
indicates the provision of recreational, leisure services.  The length of municipal roads proxies 
the provision of local infrastructure goods and the share of waste collected indicates public 
environmental and ecological services.  Clearly, none of these variables is a direct output 
measure and they should best be seen as crude proxies for the level of public goods provision 
(De Borger et al., 1994; De Borger and Kerstens, 1996).  Therefore, as in previous work on 
local government efficiency, “the outputs used are rather loosely related to the services 
delivered by municipal governments” (De Borger and Kerstens, 1996, 153-154).  This, 
regrettably, reflects the general problem with defining and measuring public sector outputs 
(cfr. Levitt and Joyce, 1987; De Borger and Kerstens, 1996).
7  The results are summarized in 
table 1. 
                                                 
5   We are grateful to two anonymous referees for pointing this out to us. 
6    One might argue that taking total expenditures is inappropriate if not all dimensions of public goods 
provision are taken up into the efficiency calculation.  Therefore, we re-estimated the efficiency ratings 
using only spending on those issues for which we observe government outputs (discussed below).  The 
correlation between both sets of efficiency ratings is very high (r=0.72) and they lead to the same qualitative 
conclusions.  We are grateful to Holger Sieg for pointing this out to us (results available upon request). 
7   Unfortunately, information on variation in output quality and input prices was not available.  Panel data 
could admittedly help in resolving some of the problems related to these measurement issues.  However,   7
 
Table 1: Technical efficiency in Flemish municipalities (N=304) 
 
 
DEA-crs 
(1) 
DEA-vrs 
(2) 
Scale  
=(1)/(2) 
FDH SF-Mean 
Average  (all)  49.57 64.32 79.82 95.04 85.76 
Average  (inefficient)  47.74 58.19 78.14 77.81 85.76 
Standard  deviation  14.06 20.06 15.61 11.58  5.24 
Minimum  17.98 24.51 34.80 28.81 57.18 
Maximum  100 100 100 100  95.52 
Number  inefficient  297  265  295 82 304 
Number  efficient 7  39  9 222 0 
of which efficient by 
default
a 
0 6 -  154  - 
Note: 
a Municipalities are efficient by default when the are not dominated by another municipality, 
but also do not dominate any other municipality. 
 
As can be seen in table 1, there appears to be scope for improvements in the performance of 
municipal governments (in terms of their economically efficient use of inputs in the 
production of public goods).  This is in line with by and large all previous studies on local 
government performance, both those regarding overall performance (as here) as those 
concentrating on one particular service (see De Borger and Kerstens, 2000).  Still, given the 
data-problem mentioned above, interpreting the levels of (in)efficiency mentioned in Table 1 
should be done with proper care and we will therefore not dwell on these findings here.
8   
 
Regarding our central research question, it can be easily seen that the efficiency ratings from 
the three non-parametric approaches (FDH, DEA-crs and DEA-vrs) clearly depend on the 
assumptions made with respect to the shape of the best practice frontier (or, in other words, on 
the restrictions placed on the linear programming problem in equation (1)).  For example, 
measuring efficiency without scale efficiency effects (i.e. imposing variable rather than 
constant returns to scale in the DEA approach) leads to significantly higher estimated 
efficiency ratings.  In fact, the difference between the average value under DEA-vrs and 
DEA-crs is statistically significant (t = 4.39; p<0.01).
9   Also, when we drop the convexity 
assumption (i.e. move from DEA to FDH), the estimated efficiency scores become even 
higher (as expected since the best practice frontier then wraps itself closer around the data).  
Difference-in-means t-tests indicate that these differences between FDH and DEA-crs and 
DEA-vrs are statistically significant beyond the 1% level (t = 15.63 and t = 9.51 respectively).  
                                                                                                                                                          
time series data were not available for several of our output variables such that this could not be addressed 
in the present analysis. 
8    Also, the level of (in)efficiency observed using these methods is affected by the choice of inputs and 
outputs.  Whereas this choice in the present analysis has been determined by data availability and previous 
scientific analyses, this choice should in real-world applications be carefully defended.  The reason is that 
the resulting efficiency estimates and judgments might otherwise benefit those who values and interests 
have been most influential in the choice of input and output variables. 
9   Note that this also indicates that a significant part of the observed inefficiency (i.e. roughly 20 percent) 
derives from production at an inefficient scale (though it does not indicate whether the scale of production is 
too small or too large on average).  A similar effect is observed for data on New South Wales by 
Worthington and Dollery (2002), for Spanish municipalities by Balaguer-Coll et al. (2002) and for US cities 
by Moore et al. (2005).  Still, disregarding scale effects, excessive use of resources still occurred (as can be 
seen in column (2) of Table 1).   8
However, 154 of the 222 municipalities designated as efficient under FDH are efficient ‘by 
default’ (i.e. these municipalities are not dominated by another municipality, but also fail to 
dominate any other).  Hence, their efficiency status lacks substantive meaning (e.g. De Borger 
et al., 1992) and one might state that they figure as ‘soldiers in no-mans land’.  Moving from 
the non-parametric approaches to the parametric one, such ‘soldiers in no-mans land’ 
disappear.  Just as among the non-parametric approaches, however, the estimated inefficiency 
is likewise found to differ significantly between the non-parametric approaches and the 
parametric one.  Indeed, the average inefficiency level under SF-Mean is substantially smaller 
than under the DEA approach (t = 14.34 and t = 7.42 when comparing SF-Mean to DEA-crs 
and DEA-vrs respectively), but larger than under FDH (t = 3.94).
10  Similar results have been 
found by, among others, De Borger and Kerstens (1996) and Balcombe et al. (2006).  
 
Before we conclude that the various approaches lead to different results, it is important to 
remember that arguably the most important information to be taken from these types of 
studies is the relative performance of municipalities.  In fact, it is well-known that the 
absolute efficiency levels derived from the analysis are specific to the sample used and 
assumptions made (cfr. supra).  Hence, it may be more important to compare the various 
approaches in terms of the ordering of municipalities from more to less efficient.  To the 
extent that such a relative performance assessment leads to the same results across 
approaches, we are able to clearly distinguish which municipalities consistently do better than 
the others.  In order to assess this relative ordering of efficiencies across municipalities, we 
calculate the interrelation between the results from all four measures presented.  The resulting 
correlation matrix is presented in table 2.   
 
Table 2: Correlation matrix efficiency scores 
 
 
DEA-crs DEA-vrs  FDH  SF-Mean 
DEA-crs  1     
DEA-vrs 0.703  1     
FDH 0.322  0.419  1   
SF-Mean 0.695  0.574  0.447  1 
 
It is clear from table 2 that the outcomes using the various approaches are generally relatively 
strongly positively correlated.
11   This indicates that – although there are differences in the 
exact level of efficiency depending on the approach used (see table 1) – the efficiency ratings 
from various approaches tend to support similar conclusions as to the municipalities’ relative 
performance (cfr. De Borger and Kerstens, 1996; Cummins and Zi, 1998; von Hirschhausen 
et al., 2006; Balcombe et al., 2006).  This is reassuring given that all measures discussed in 
this analysis are essentially relative rather than absolute performance measures (calculating 
inefficiency relative to the data-specific best practice frontier rather than to some a priori 
exogenous determination of efficiency).  Nonetheless, the largest value in table 2 is 0.70.  
Hence, significant variation remains even in the relative performance of municipalities across 
the various efficiency approaches. This should lead future researchers to carefully check 
whether the results employing their preferred efficiency measure(s) are robust against using 
alternative approaches. 
                                                 
10   The inefficiency of the inefficient municipalities is, however, larger under FDH than SF-Mean. 
11   Obviously, the correlations between FDH and the other approaches are lower due to the large number of 
observations that are ‘efficient by default’ under the FDH-method.   9
4. Conclusion and discussion 
Shifting the provision of public goods to regional or local levels of government may be – at 
least theoretically – intrinsically desirable for certain types of public services (cfr. Mill, 1861; 
Musgrave 1959; Oates 1972, 1999; Tullock, 1969).  It, however, engenders the question 
whether local governments are capable of adequately and accurately executing the tasks 
bestowed on them.  One of the means to evaluate this question is by looking at the economic 
efficiency of local governments.  Indeed, one can question the benefits of a further 
decentralisation of tasks to local governments when local governments are incapable of 
adequately executing their current tasks (unless, obviously, higher-level governments are 
found to be even less efficient than local ones).  Nevertheless, for an evaluation of local 
governments’ economic efficiency to be of practical value, we need to understand the tools 
through which such an assessment is made in practice.  This is not a trivial question as the 
assessment of economic (or technical) efficiency is not straightforward, and various 
approaches to measure it have been brought forward in the literature.  These, however, build 
on different underlying assumptions to calculate efficiency.  To the extent that these 
approaches lead to similar results, we can rest assured that the results are robust to differences 
in these underlying assumptions. If not, we need to be careful in interpreting the results from 
studies using one particular approach.   
 
In the present paper, we addressed this (methodological) question by employing a number of 
parametric and non-parametric approaches to estimate the level of local government technical 
(in)efficiency in Flanders in 2000.  The results allow for two main conclusions.  Firstly, all 
approaches indicate at least some scope for improvement in the efficiency of the Flemish 
municipalities.  One may therefore question their ability and/or willingness to efficiently 
perform the tasks allocated to them and, in the same breath, the oft-cited rational to further 
decentralise public goods provision towards local levels of government.
12  Secondly, and 
more crucially to our central research question, comparing the outcomes of the various 
approaches to efficiency measurement indicates that the point estimates for (in)efficiency can 
vary widely depending on the specific approach used.  Nonetheless, the results are generally 
relatively strongly correlated such that they tend to support similar conclusions as to the 
municipalities’  relative performance.  Since all approaches included in the present study 
essentially are relative rather than absolute performance measures, this is reassuring.  
 
Finally, however, a word of caution is in order.  The results of efficiency measurements such 
as those presented in this work crucially depend on the availability of adequate, timely and 
accurate data.  Data availability (or, rather, lack thereof) made it impossible to include 
measures for all – or even most – local government outputs, to account for possible quality 
and input price variations and to extend the analysis over multiple years.  Hence, our results 
should not be taken as an ultimate end.  Rather, the data limitations confronting the present 
analysis should be regarded as a point of debate in the discussion on (local) government 
performance measurement (cfr. Moore et al., 2005).  Without adequate information about the 
level and quality of public good provisions, an assessment of whether or not the ‘value for 
money’ of public good provision is satisfactory is problematic. Such assessments at different 
levels of government, however, are crucial as a means to assess part of the potential benefits 
of (further) fiscal decentralisation. 
                                                 
12   On a more positive note, one might argue that at least part of the fiscal problems faced by local governments 
in Flanders these days can be confronted by making more efficient use of available resources.  Given the 
inherent unpopularity of tax increases (Niskanen, 1979; Vermeir and Heyndels, 2006), this might be seen by 
local politicians as a viable – and electorally more rewarding (or, at least, less intricate) – alternative.   10
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